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Introduction  
In November 2013, the international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia held its 15th 
plenary during a week-long counter-piracy seminar at the Kempinski Hotel in Djibouti. The Contact 
Group is an informal global governance forum mandated with addressing Somali piracy. A wide range 
of actors participates in it, including representatives of major nation states, international organizations, 
regional organizations, industry associations and a number of other non-governmental bodies. 
Attending the meeting, I made a surprising observation: though this was a meeting of the contact group 
on piracy, hardly anyone used the term ‘pirate’. Participants discussed the ‘HRA’ – the so-called ‘High 
Risk Area’ – ‘networks’ and ‘illicit financial flows’, ‘root causes’, ‘PSCAP’ – Private Security 
Contractors – and ‘capacity building’. Discussing who the pirates were, their actions, or what motivated 
them, apparently seemed too abecedarian for the gathered participants, was considered settled, or 
unrelated to developing responses to the problem of piracy. 
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If I didn’t encounter pirates in Djibouti, luckily, a week before travelling there, I saw a Hollywood 
action drama named Captain Phillips. From the comfort of my cinema seat, I encountered Abduwali 
Muse and his friends Assad, Bilal, Elmi, and Hufan – a ‘gang’ of more or less tragic young boys who 
fail terribly in committing an act of piracy, being outsmarted by the American hero Captain Phillips. 
The 1990 feature Home Alone came to mind several times; just as I felt sympathetic towards Harry and 
Marv – the two clumsy ‘Wet Bandits’ who attempt to burgle Kevin’s home – the fate of Muse and his 
gang triggered similar sentiments.  
Whilst discussing the first draft of this article with one of my colleagues, he revealed that he was the 
30,000th most feared pirate in the world. As it happened, he had spent his free time that weekend 
plundering ships, hunting for treasure and looting islands. That is, he had become Edward Kenway, a 
Welsh privateer-turned-pirate exploring the Caribbean – in the virtual world of Xbox game Assassin's 
Creed IV: Black Flag. 
These three anecdotes are examples of how one can experience piracy and encounter pirates today. 
While all are ‘virtual’, in that they did not include face-to-face encounters with pirates, the technocratic 
meeting in Djibouti and the consumer experiences at the cinema and on the Xbox are quite different. If, 
in the former case, pirates were absent as immediate actors and only present as a technical problem, in 
the latter they featured as tragic protagonists or romantic heroes. These experiences represent instances 
of what I shall call the ‘agencements’ of piracy. In such situations, certain forms of pirate agency are 
produced. 
Pirates are used in this study as a paradigmatic case of international agency. The primary objective of 
my discussion is to offer a renewed understanding of agency and how its multiplicity can be empirically 
reconstructed. Too often in the study of international relations, agency is either neglected at the expense 
of structural arguments, or simply taken for granted (Bucher 2017). In particular, we frequently speak 
of states or international organizations as actors, without actually having understood what kind of 
agency these forms imply and what they depend upon.1 What are the resources and relations that are 
required to produce distinct types of agency? Addressing this question and opening the black box of 
agency allows for a better understanding of how agency is performed. It also gives us a gateway to 
grasp the multiplicity of agency, that is, to inquire how one actor (individual or organisation) can rely 
on different – potentially contradicting – forms of agency. I start with a note on the theoretical 
suppositions of this study and a brief outline of the relationalist concept of agency as product of 
agencements. I then engage in an empirical study of pirate agency that outlines six different forms, 
while the conclusion discusses some of the consequences of my reconstruction for international 
relations theory more broadly.  
 
To theory: A relational account of agency  
This article proceeds from the assertion that agency is not exclusively, or primarily, the property of 
‘persons’, ‘individuals’, ‘humans’ or ‘subjects’ (or however you choose to term what we colloquially 
refer to as ‘I’, ‘me’, or ‘us’). In political science and international relations (IR), the idea that there is 
more to agency than the individual subject is a well-established concept. Indeed, it was a core concern 
in the so-called ‘agency-structure’ debate of the 1990s.2 When this debate, in large part inspired by 
                                                            
1 There is, of course, also a substantial discussion of what makes states and international organizations actors. 
See e.g. Passoth and Rowland (2010) and Schindler (2014).  
2 See in particular Doty (1997) for a summary and critique.  
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Anthony Giddens’ framing of the problem (Wendt 1987), fell out of fashion, the meagre conclusion 
was that agency, defined as the capacity to act, is dependent upon structure, which constrains and 
enables, but that neither agency nor structure in their own right could explain the world of international 
relations as it is. Contemplating the relation between agency and structure has since made it to the core 
curriculum of the discipline. There are manifold ‘solutions’ to the conundrum, one of them being that 
thinking in dualisms may not be the way to approach the problem.3  
If one does not want to glean an understanding of agency by contrasting it with structure, what other 
options are available? Turning to social theory, as usual, helps, and here it is the sub-branch of ‘theories 
of action’ that is of interest. If agency is the capacity to act, what does ‘action’ or ‘acting’ mean? One 
maynow subscribe to either of the most widespread models of action, that is, the infamous ‘homo 
economicus’ – the interest-following and maximizing individual proposed by economists, or so-called 
‘theory of rational choice’ – or the ‘homo sociologicus’ – the norms and ‘ought-to’ rule-evaluating 
individual proposed by various branches of sociology.  
Alternatively, one can proceed by means of distinction, and differentiate, for instance, ‘action’ from 
‘behaviour’.4 Insisting upon this difference leads one to the conclusion, that, if they are different at all, 
action, in contrast to behaviour, presupposes a system of meanings, or culture, by which action becomes 
meaningful.5 This step, once again, opens up a pluriverse of different understandings of ‘culture’, 
whether to understand it as a textual, cognitive or practical phenomenon, and how it relates to action.  
It is useful to employ a pluriversal notion of agency; it is not a single concept with one meaning, but 
several. There are different forms of agency, none of them being the only ‘true’ or ‘real’ expression. I 
leave it to others to provide a taxonomy of forms of agency – something that would be more than 
welcome.6 For our present purposes, I draw on a notion of agency outlined by pragmatism and 
relationalist sociology also known as Actor-Network Theory, Sociology of Translation, or New French 
Pragmatism. The proposal is to understand agency as a ‘distributed’ form. Agency depends upon, and 
is the effect of, webs of relations set up in and through practice.7 Such sets of relations provide the 
capacity to act. This represents a break with the notion of an identifiable habitual subject within 
structures, and highlights instead the multiplicity within actors. Agency is seen as constituted and 
constructed in and through the movement of a distinct practice. In other words, persons are not persons 
or actors outside their actions (Benatouil 1999). Agency is an effect of practices and relations. Agents 
are bestowed with agency qua their participation in a practice. The focus turns to the empirical 
intricacies of agency and an analysis of concrete practices and relations. 
Several terms have been proposed to signify the set of relations and practices that produce agency. This 
includes the concept of ‘actor-network’ or ‘assemblage’. In the following, I draw on the concept of 
‘agencement’ as introduced to the debate by Michel Callon. As Callon (2007) suggests, agencement is 
a French term that has no direct English counterpart, but is close to ‘arrangement’ or ‘assemblage’.8 
Indeed, agencement has often been translated into English as ‘assemblage’. As noted by, among others, 
Callon (2007), Hardi and McKenzie (2007: 58), and Gherardi (2016), this translation shifts the meaning 
                                                            
3 See Hay (2009) for an argument that the relation should be seen as more complex. This is also stressed by 
contemporary practice theorists, such as Adler and Pouliot (2011). See also the discussion in Bucher (2017). 
4 See Adler and Pouliot (2011) for such a move.  
5 See Reckwitz (2002) for this argument.  
6 Useful primers in this regard are e.g. Reckwitz (2002) and Joas (1996).  
7 Theoretical contributions that outline such an understanding of agency include Emirbayer and Mische (1998), 
Hay (2009), Berard (2005), Callon (2007), and Licoppe (2010).  
8 See the discussion of the concept in Phillips (2006) and Gherardi (2016).  
4 
 
of the concept considerably towards a structural metaphor, however, and removes the distinct emphasis 
on agency. Agencement is a preferable concept since it has a common root with the term ‘agency’: 
“agencements are arrangements endowed with the capacity of acting in different ways depending on 
their configuration” (Callon 2007). Agencements comprise a set of heterogeneous elements that have 
carefully been adjusted to each other. Within agencements subjectivities, that is, the capacity to act, are 
formed. Actors become constructed as such and gain the capacity to act in a distinct way. As Callon 
and Caliskan (2010: 9) note, “agencements denote sociotechnical arrangements when they are 
considered from the point [of] view of their capacity to act and to give meaning to action”. This implies 
that “actors do not have inherent properties or a fixed ontology. Their characteristics are constituted by 
the agencements of which they are made up” (Hardie and McKenzie 2007: 58).  
As Callon, referring to the work of economists, points out, one element in these configurations is 
‘statements’. Economists studying markets, should not, Callon insists, be understood as producing 
statements outside the agencement that produce markets. There is nothing left outside agencements. 
The construction of the agencement is part of an agencement. “It includes the statements pointing to it, 
and it is because the former includes the latter that the agencement acts in line with the statement, just 
as the operating instructions are part of the device and participate in making it work” (Callon 2007). 
For the case of piracy, such statements include, for instance, the examples with which I began this 
article, that is, intergovernmental deliberations, such as those that took place in Djibouti, and movies 
representing pirates, such as Captain Phillips. It also includes experts discussing counter-piracy or the 
representations manufactured in what can be called the ‘community of inquiry’ of piracy, or ‘piracy 
studies’ (Bueger 2014). 
What I am interested in is, therefore, the relations and practices that form the agencements of piracy. If 
agency is the product of agencements, a logical consequence is the potential multiplicity of these forms. 
I have used the plural on purpose. Agency is multiple. The empirical concern of an analysis of agency 
is then to identify as many of the agencements amongst which actors move as possible. The objective 
is less to find a single agencement. Indeed, a situation where research will lead to the identification of 
one agencement, or two agencements (e.g. a binary of hegemony and resistance), is expected to be rare. 
Although empirical inquiry might lead to such results, the prevalence of an all-encompassing, or 
hegemonic, agencement will be the exception rather than the norm. In any case, agency becomes an 
empirical, rather than an ontological problem. 
As to methodology and the following study of piracy agency: the starting point of my analysis is a set 
of experiences with the pirates of Somalia. The objective of my empirical reconstruction is to identify 
a number of agencements of piracy and the forms of agency they produce for pirates. My methodology 
is based on my own experience and encounters with pirates. Following the principle that we cannot 
establish a priori which forms of statements, relations and practices constitute pirate agency, I rely on 
various epistemic practices and as broad a range of sources as possible. This includes media experiences 
such as watching movies and playing computer games, but also more classic scholarly practices, 
including participating as an observer in counter-piracy governance meetings, taking field notes, talking 
to interlocutors, as well as reading academic literature. The starting point is the question: in which 
experiences can one encounter (Somali) pirates today?  
My concern is not with objectifying the agency of piracy. Neither do I claim that the agencements I 
identify represent an exhaustive set, nor am I here concerned with documenting the borders and 
boundaries between each of the agencements. My modest intent is to show how Muse, his friends and 
other actors described as pirates are subjected to different agencements which provide them with 
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differing forms of agency. This has, of course, consequences for how we think about agency in 
international relations and study it empirically, which is an issue I shall come back to in the conclusion. 
In the following, I discuss six agencements of piracy that can be identified empirically. Each of these 
agencements provide differing forms of agency. As summarized in table one, depending on the 
agencement, Muse and his friends are provided with the capacity to act quite differently. The remainder 
of the article fleshes out each of these agencements. 
 
Table 1: Agencements of Somali Piracy 
Pirates as  Main relations Agency 
“Moral Bandits” Ethical relations Pursues justifiable outcomes, is subject to ethical judgement 
 
“Enemies” Security relations Can resort to indiscriminate violence, is subject of violence 
 
“Criminals”  Legal relations Violates the law, has rights, is subject to law enforcement 
 
“Entrepreneurs” Economic relations Calculates and maximizes economic gains, partners in economic 
transactions 
 
“Symptoms” Causal relations Effect of causes, no agency per se 
 
“Political Actors” Political relations Counter-agencement, pursues political objectives, follows rules, is 
politically recognized  
   
 
Bandits: Moral Agency? 
Let us start from my experience with Captain Philips, as many readers may have seen this movie and 
draw their understanding of piracy from it. This first agencement brings me to Hollywood, Captain 
Philips, Home Alone and films such as Disney’s Pirates of the Caribbean series. In these popular 
movies, pirates are projected as romantic or tragic ‘bandits’, or even ‘heroes’. This agencement 
understands piracy in a somehow positive light. It is based on a set of normative-affective relations.  
The former commander of one of the naval counter-piracy task forces operating in the Gulf of Aden, 
Terry McKnight, opens his auto-biographical reflections on counter-piracy with the following words: 
“Why write a book about Somali piracy? More precisely, why did I write such a book? The answer is 
surprisingly simple. I was bitten by the piracy bug while working the mission in the Gulf of Aden. Pirates are 
fascinating, and I don’t mean the Disney kind, although Johnny Depp is a very cool customer. But at times, I 
felt like Peter Pan chasing Captain Hook in the Neverlands of Somalia. I’m definitely not trying to romanticize 
what pirates do because, as a mariner, I find their actions reprehensible. But it does take guts. Most of these 
pirates come from the hill country of Somalia; they’ve never been to sea. A lot of them can’t even swim. Yet, 
in the spirit of the pioneers who opened the American West, they get into tiny boats and head out on one of 
the earth’s great oceans, oftentimes hundreds of miles toward the unknown, gambling their lives on very long 
odds” (McKnight and Hirsh 2012: xiii).  
McKnight’s reflection is paradigmatic in at least three ways. Firstly, he draws on cultural and historical 
references to make sense of Somali pirates (Disney, Pirates of the Caribbean, Captain Hook). Secondly, 
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his statement reflects an emotional attachment to pirates and a form of admiration (“it takes guts”, 
“pioneers of the American West”). Thirdly, in his statement, he separates actions and deeds from other 
aspects (he finds the actions reprehensible, but admires the character attribute of bravery). 
Throughout discussions of Somali piracy, references to movies such as Pirates of the Caribbean and to 
characters such as Johnny Depp’s Captain Sparrow are frequently made, whether in newspaper articles, 
conference presentations or academic papers. This not only points to the success of the Disney 
Corporation and its franchises to commodify, if not even monopolize, the meaning of piracy (Jess-
Cooke 2010). Cultural products provide the main common-sense source of statements on and 
interpretations of piracy. As David Cordingly (1995:2-3) remarks, “the picture [of pirates] which most 
of us have turns out to be a blend of historical facts overlaid with three centuries of ballads, melodramas, 
epic poems, romantic novels, adventure stories, comic strips and films.” He continues: “in this process, 
the pirates have acquired a romantic aura” (Cordingly 1995:3). Whether or not the romantic imagery 
has any historical basis is a theme of interest and indeed controversy among historians. The cultural 
historian Rediker (2004) argues that pirates, formerly poor seamen in the main, were libertarian heroes 
and anarchic rebels that fought against the injustices of the shipping labour market as well as the 
brutality and hierarchy of the navy and the merchant captains. They developed a democratic and 
egalitarian culture on board pirate ships that included the election of captains or the equitable division 
of plunder (see also the analysis of Parker 2012: 46-51 and Land 2007). For Land (2007), historical 
pirates were adventurers and anarchists that challenged the dominant social order of the time. Much of 
the public fascination and appeal as well as the ‘news value’ of piracy is related to such an 
understanding. The underlying form of admiration and sympathy either in romanticizing piracy, or 
appreciating their tragedy or heroism, is part of an agencement which situates piracy in a web of 
affective as well as normative relations.  
A study by Ali and Murad (2009) interviewed people who had settled in Canada from Somalia. Some 
of the quotes are quite revealing. One interviewee is cited as saying that “although they [pirates] can be 
bad people, what they are doing is good for the country because the international community is dumping 
and fishing in Somali waters and the piracy is stopping this; piracy is bad, but the intruders are also 
doing bad things” (Ali and Murad 2009: 98). Another describes pirates as a “bunch of thieves, but some, 
as far as Somalis are concerned, are heroes because they are defending our natural and marine 
resources” (Ali and Murad 2009: 98). A third says, “I don’t agree with the piracy by itself. But, in this 
case, to go against the illegal dumping and the fishing…they have a right to do that, they have a right 
to protect the country and the water.” (Ali and Murad 2009: 98). These three statements all make a 
similar argument. They agree that what seajackers do is condemnable (“bad people”, “piracy is bad”, 
“a bunch of thieves”) but that the objectives, as well as effects, are morally justified (“what they are 
doing is good for the country”, “are heroes”, “have a right to do that”). Such statements are indicative 
of the way that this agencement is not only affective, but also centred on the normative evaluation and 
justifiability of pirate action. An academic study that feeds into this understanding is provided by the 
political theorist James Patinson (2013). Evaluating the behaviour of Somali pirates against the 
standards of just war theory, he finds that the pirates act on justifiable moral grounds.  
This discussion hence points us to a first piracy agencement. In this agencement, the pirate is a moral 
bandit. A pirate pursues ethically justifiable ends and is the subject of such evaluations. Agency is based 
on cultural, historical as well as ethical relations. Movies, novels and other cultural goods are the main 
artefacts that establish affective relations while the statements of normative political theorists strengthen 
those relations. The outcome is that pirate action is seen in a relatively positive light, as long as he 
operates within the ethical and affective boundaries. This is in sharp contrast to the agencement I discuss 
next.  
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Enemies of all Mankind: Security Agency? 
In the opening scene of the 2010 action movie The Expendables, featuring Sylvester Stallone as well as 
an impressive line-up of other action heroes, pirates make a noteworthy, if brief, appearance. Marshall 
Fine (2010) describes the scene as follows: “Stallone plays Barney Ross, leader of a crew of 
mercenaries, first glimpsed taking out a gang of Somali pirates on a freighter the raiders have held for 
three months. Stallone and friends show up with the money – but it's not as much as the pirates asked 
for. When the pirates get chesty with Stallone and Co., bang, no more pirates.” In an even more nuanced 
manner, Ty Burr (2010) commented: “The opening scene is set aboard a Somalian pirate ship, with the 
rough, tough mercenary team led by Stallone’s Barney Ross using extreme prejudice to rescue US 
hostages from badly accented, badly acted villains. Bodies and knives fly through the air, limbs are 
separated from their owners, obscene amounts of ordnance are deployed. It’s all so ... uncomplicated.” 
Those that have seen the movie will certainly have an understanding of what Burr means by the “badly 
accented, badly acted villains”. For those who missed out, the following (impressively delivered) line 
of pirate dialogue provides a flavour: “I will kill all, I will kill all of them”. What makes the movie 
interesting is that it is the first contemporary mainstream feature to address the motif of the Somali 
pirate. It does so in projecting the pirate as an evil villain that without doubt – or in Burr’s word, without 
‘complication’ – can be killed. The pirate is not a moral or political being, nor a criminal, he is the 
radical ‘other’. This image of the pirate presents quite a radical shift from the way that Hollywood 
usually presents pirates, especially in the light of the Pirates of the Caribbean series (screened from 
2003-2011). The movie reflected a broader trend in 2009 and 2010. Calls for “eradicating piracy, once 
and for all” by using brute force were especially widespread during the early heyday of counter-piracy 
in 2008.9 The military repertoire of targeted strikes, drone attacks, snipers and special forces to raid 
piracy camps, attack them at sea or violently re-capture hijacked vessels were touted as primary means. 
Analysts and commentators cited historical cases including Julius Caesar’s raid against pirates and the 
US navy’s Barbary Wars as precedents documenting that a “war against piracy” directed at killing 
pirates is the only viable option that promises success.10 
The pirate as an antagonist and the underlying agencement, to which the movie and commentators point, 
has a long history. Daniel Heller-Roazen (2009) provides a political history reconstructing how an 
understanding of pirates as a universal type of enemy that must be eradicated by violent force can be 
traced back to the Roman Empire and its attempt to establish authority over the Mediterranean. The 
well-known description of pirates as the “common enemy of all” (communis hostis omnium) is 
commonly ascribed to Cicero, and has significantly shaped thinking about pirates as the universal 
antagonist operating outside the law or social conventions. In this understanding, the pirate is neither a 
political, nor a moral, legal, or economic subject, since he stands outside of humanity. Hence, rights 
and obligations do not apply to pirates.  
If in the first agencement, the bandit has to balance his moral goals and his immoral means, the pirate 
in this agencement is free of such considerations. The pirate is an enemy, a radical ‘other’. He operates 
outside of humanity and international relations and its social conventions and laws. Free to determine 
his course of action and able to rely on any means available, he conversely also faces the risk, like a 
bothersome fly, of being killed without hesitation. The agencement works by establishing historical 
                                                            
9 See, for instance, the summary in Bliss (2009).  
10 E.g. Bellamy (2011). 
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relations and in adopting a security logic in which pirates are presented as enemy of humanity which 
requires extra-ordinary measures. This agencement turns pirates into agents outside the law, the third 
agencement does the opposite in turning piracy into a legal category.  
 
International Criminals: Legal Agency? 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines piracy in article 101 as  
Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew 
or the passengers of a private ship and directed on the high seas, against another ship, or against persons or 
property on board such ship, or against a ship, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with knowledge of facts making it a pirate 
ship. Any act of inciting to or of intentionally facilitating such acts.  
When the negotiation of UNCLOS was concluded in the 1980s this presented a stepping stone; it turned 
pirates into subjects of the international legal order. The definition is the outcome of centuries of 
controversy and negotiations of how to define piracy and where it might fit into the web of international 
law (Rubin 1988). The debate over the definition, how it relates to other legal documents and what it 
implies has by no means ended, and continues to fascinate several legal practitioners and theorists.  
Indeed, UNCLOS is one text in a more complex legal thicket of transnational legal documents that 
forms the legal agencement within which pirates are criminal and subject to international criminal law. 
Other legal texts of the agencement include the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 
UN Security Council resolutions, national criminal laws (under which pirates are prosecuted) and a 
diverse set of bilateral and multi-lateral agreements and memoranda of understanding, such as so-called 
transfer protocols by which suspects are moved from an arresting national legal system to the 
prosecuting one.11 Such documents are the core artefacts that produce the legal agencement of piracy. 
Since documents do not speak for themselves, or fall from heaven, a vital element of the assemblage is 
the drafting and interpretation work of legal experts. Legal experts were not only required to interpret 
how existing laws were appropriate for Somali piracy, although a new legal thicket was woven in the 
assemblage. For instance, groups of legal experts, such as the Working Group 2 of the Contact Group 
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia attempted to develop a canon of interpretation that can be used to 
prosecute pirates and national laws could be aligned with each other. To be a pirate in this assemblage, 
implies to be turned from a ‘suspect’ into a pirate. It is dependent upon the work of a court. It is within 
a judge’s discretion and his interpretation of the legal basis and evidence whether and when an 
individual is to be considered a pirate.   
Paying closer attention to the UNCLOS definition is important since it provides an influential fixation 
of the meaning of piracy. It establishes a noteworthy categorical system that determines who a pirate is. 
UNCLOS establishes a set of pirate activities: ‘violence’, ‘detention’, ‘depredation’, ‘operation of a 
ship’ or ‘facilitation of such acts’. Secondly, it defines that these acts constitute piracy if they are 
“committed for private ends”, and thirdly, that these activities take place “outside the jurisdiction of 
any state”. This technical legal definition thereby establishes a distinct type of agency: firstly, in a legal 
                                                            
11 Attempts to disentangle this thicket are made in Geiss and Petrig (2011), Kraska and Pedrozo (2013: 691-738), 
Guilfoyle (2013) as well as an estimated 300 articles on the law of piracy published since the conclusion of the 
UNCLOS negotiation.  
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sense, piracy is not directed at political goals or sanctioned by a state – piracy is apolitical, and as a 
pirate, you cannot claim political or moral motives, nor are you outside the law.  
Secondly, pirate activity must occur in international waters. International border agreements are hence 
the constitutive boundaries for piracy acts. In legal terminology, acts occurring within the jurisdiction 
of a state therefore require a different term – the customary one is that of ‘armed robbery at sea’. Pirates 
hence navigate a fine line between being a pirate or an armed robber. If you cross the line you become 
a pirate, you move back and become an armed robber at sea. To be a pirate you need to know where 
you are and where the border is.  
Thirdly, the legal structure defines piracy as a ‘crime’. Pirates are, therefore, criminals. As Friman and 
Lindborg (2013: 174) concisely summarize, “this implies that pirates, like all other criminals, are 
presumed innocent until proven guilty in a fair trial before a court of law. It also means that (persons 
suspected to be) pirates may not be killed as if they were the enemy nor may they be unlawfully 
renditioned, tortured or held for years without trial.” Hence, under the assumption of innocence, without 
a trial, no one is a pirate, but a suspect of piracy – hence, the concept of the ‘piracy suspect’ is 
established. The relations and categorical systems that turn pirates into legal subjects also establish a 
set of rights. Pirates have human rights, can claim asylum (Dutton 2011), and have the right to a fair 
trial (e.g. Osiro 2011, Friman and Lindborg 2013).  
The agencement then not only consists of legal texts, but also their interpreters, legal experts, 
prosecutors, lawyers and judges, diplomats relying on legal expertise, as well as the wider spectrum of 
criminological professions. It also includes those actors and practices engaging in legal capacity 
building, such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s work on developing the legal sector in Somalia 
and its neighbouring states.  
In this agencement, pirates are subjects of legal and criminological relations. To become a pirate 
requires passing through a set of legal interpretations and institutions such as courts and conforming 
with criteria set out in legal texts. These legal relations also establish rights. In contrast to the former 
agencement in which the pirate as enemy can simply be shot, in the legal agencement they are treated 
as suspects, and must be arrested and prosecuted.  
 
Business Model: Economic Agency? 
In 2009, tech culture magazine Wired published an article on Somali piracy along with an enjoyable 
online game entitled ‘Cutthroat Capitalism’ (Carney 2009). The well-illustrated article and the 
accompanying game presented piracy as an interactive mathematical model between pirates, shippers, 
insurance companies, security consultants, and navies. Each actor group follows a distinct logic, namely 
‘pirate’s math’, ‘shipper’s math’ and ‘insurance company’s math’. For the author of the article and the 
designers of the game, piracy can be modelled following three calculations that a (prospective) pirate 
has to ponder.  
The first calculation of pirate’s math, titled ‘Plunder Pays’, addresses whether to engage in piracy 
(Carney 2009: 122). This involves weighing estimated income from piracy against the average income 
in Somalia. The second calculation, ‘When to Attack’, is a calculation of the likelihood of success of a 
piracy attempt (Carney 2009: 123), requiring consideration of the characteristics of the target and the 
likelihood of military response. The third and final calculation, ‘How Much to Demand’, concerns 
factors influencing the ransom negotiation process (Carney 2009: 125), such as prior ransoms, cargo 
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surcharge, or time to resolution. On the basis of these formulas as well as the respective ones for 
shippers, insurance companies, security consultants, and navies, an interactive online game is presented 
that simulates being a pirate. Skipping the first calculation, once in the game, one makes decisions and 
attempts to attack vessels and, if successful, negotiates ransoms.  
The Wired game is most likely the first in a wider series of attempts to simulate pirate activity on the 
basis of mathematical modelling. For instance, a more advanced and complex model was developed by 
the Czech university-based Agent Technology Center (2014). In their project “AgentC: Employing 
Agents to Fight Maritime Piracy”, sponsored by, among others, the US Office of Naval Research, a 
team of computer scientists developed a maritime simulation model with a focus on fighting maritime 
piracy. The model is based on artificial intelligence theories and aims at developing algorithms for the 
behaviour of actors (navies, shipping companies, and pirates). The graph below shows how Agent C 
models the behaviour of pirates.  
 
Graph 1: AgentC’s finite state machine of the pirate vessel agent 
 
Source: Jakob et al. 2012: 4 
The declared objective of the project is “to improve the efficiencies of counter-piracy measures and to 
assess the risk of piracy” (Agent Technology Center 2014). Both the Wired game and the AgentC 
simulation are projects that turn piracy into a calculated entity. They feed an agencement that makes 
piracy part of economic relations. The pirate becomes an economic subject; that is, a rational economic 
actor that evaluates expected costs and benefits and makes choices. This is what Koray Çalışkan and 
Michel Callon (2009) have referred to as a process of “economization”. The pirate becomes part of an 
economic agencement and is considered an economic subject. As reflected in the Wired game, the pirate 
is part of two market interactions. The first one is that between the shipper trying to escape or avoid 
being hijacked and the pirate. This is also what AgentC describes, along with a growing number of 
economists (e.g. Bendall 2010; Hallwood and Micelli 2013a). The second interaction is ransom 
negotiations between pirates and ship owners, usually mediated by security consultants. These can also 
be described, as by the Wired model and economists, as market interactions (Hallwood and Micelli 
2013a, b). As Jan Stockbruegger (2013) argued in his study of the economization of piracy, the 
phenomenon has increasingly been turned into an (illicit) economy. This does not only involve the 
actors and models introduced above, but also the pirates who, to follow Stockbruegger, increasingly 
behave like market actors. To describe piracy as a ‘business model’ has become widespread across the 
various kinds of actors dealing with or interested in piracy. This is the outcome of a range of practices 
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of economic actors, including shipping companies, security and intelligence consultants, lawyers, or 
insurance companies. Based on an understanding of piracy as a calculable subject, these actors make 
the pirate part of relations, such as risk mitigation as well as ransom negotiations. Piracy is considered 
a form of market exchange in which one commodity (vessel, cargo, and crew) is exchanged for another 
(ransom). This exchange can be managed through risk calculations as well as negotiation models. Part 
of this agencement is, moreover, the work of economists. Besides the already cited university-based 
economists, these include those working for the World Bank (2013) or the advocacy organization 
Oceans Beyond Piracy, which produces an annual Economic Costs of Piracy report. In this agencement, 
the pirate is a calculated subject and his agency is subject to the logic of business.  
 
Symptoms: No Agency? 
My next agencement is quite different. It does not provide pirates any form of agency. Pirates are not 
actors in their own right. Instead, pirates form part of a set of causal relations in which the pirate is a 
‘symptom’ of ‘root causes’. The agencement relies on relations made within quantification, causal 
analysis, bio-medical metaphors, and state-building projects.  
Since the 1980s, the International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce and the 
International Maritime Organization have compiled databases of piracy incidents worldwide, and a 
wide network of actors and practices is required to maintain them (see Anonymous 2015). The data is 
based on voluntary reporting, and contains a number of core characteristics of a given piracy incident 
(e.g. location, time, weapons used, type of incident). These databases translate piracy into a quantitative 
entity (Porter 1994). As Porter (1994: 389) argues, quantification is an “aspiration to escape the bounds 
of locality and culture” (Porter 1994:389). It provides the means to de-contextualize and objectify piracy 
activity. Acts become translated into statistics and graphs. Quantification allows for the measurement 
of piratical activity (even in real time) and the documenting of geographical and regional trends. Such 
trend analyses are important to formulate policies and, in particular, strengthen consensual 
interpretations of developments. They also provide the backdrop for scholarly analyses, however. Peace 
researchers and economists draw on this data to run correlations and thereby translate piracy into a set 
of causal relations (Anonymous 2013a:4). Analyses, such as those of Hastings (2009), draw on the data 
sets to identify the causes of piracy statistically. In these analyses, the occurrence of piracy, and in turn 
the pirate, become a product of so-called ‘root causes’. While some of these causes are relatively banal 
– such as the vicinity of sea lanes – others are more complex. One of the major causal factors 
emphasized in quantitative studies is that of “state failure” or “weak governance”. Here, the claim is 
that a dysfunctional state is causally related to the ‘outbreak’ of piracy. In contrast to the economic 
agencement, in this causal system of relations, piracy is no longer a question of individual choice; it is 
a causal consequence of a number of structural conditions that turn people into pirates.  
The causal link is also a statement commonly found in official policy documents. UN Security Council 
resolutions argue that the link between Somalia’s state failure and piracy justifies international action 
against piracy under Chapter Seven.12 International officials repeatedly refer to piracy as the outcome 
of root causes. As, for instance, a representative of China stated at a UN Security Council debate: 
“Piracy comes about as a result of deeply rooted economic and social factors. […] poverty and economic 
                                                            
12 See for instance UNSC Res. 1816. 
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and social underdevelopment are the root causes of piracy.”13 A World Bank official is cited as saying 
that “piracy is a symptom of the breakdown of Somalia’s political system” (The World Bank 2013b). 
Oliveira (2013) notes that such statements link the problem of piracy to the wider discourse on state-
building. The argument is that state failure causes piracy and that in turn, a state-building project 
provides the adequate response in addressing the problem of piracy. Notions such as ‘symptoms’ and 
‘root causes’ point to a bio-medical vocabulary that is not only prevalent in the discussion of piracy, 
but as Mary Manjikian (2008) has shown, in the wider state failure discourse. Following Manjikian 
(2008) within this vocabulary, state failure is naturalized and presented as an illness. In consequence, 
failed states become patients that may even be treated against their will. In other words, agency is moved 
into the hands of statebuilders, the doctors capable of treating the patient.  
As these observations imply, within this agencement the pirate is a product of nature. Quantification, 
causal analysis, and bio-medical vocabulary produce a system of relations in which piracy is a natural 
cause. Instead of agency, pirate behaviour is the causal effect of state failure. There is no room for action 
in this causal system of relations; the pirate is the effect of a natural system of causal relations. In this 
agencement, hence agency is largely denied to pirates. 
 
Resistance: Political Agency? 
Between 2008 and 2011, pirates were ever present in international news media. They frequently gave 
media interviews. Reading statements from such interviews leads to the outline of a sixth form of 
agencement. This one is somewhat different from the others. Within its relations, actors resist being 
made part of any of the above agencements. Asked about what they do when they go out and hunt for 
ships, Muse and his friends refuse to be described as pirates. Instead, they argue that they are political 
actors that perform practices of sovereignty. They collect taxes, police the sea, and protect sovereign 
boundaries and natural resources. Insofar as the status of pirate is refuted, this presents us with a form 
of counter-agencement. 
In 2009, the New York Times printed the following telephone conversation between the correspondent 
Jeffrey Gettleman and Sugule Ali, a Somali who was at that time on board the MV Faina – a Ukrainian 
freighter loaded with weapons and held hostage for a couple of days.   
“Q. Have the pirates been misunderstood?  
A. We don’t consider ourselves sea bandits ["sea bandit" is one way Somalis translate the English word 
pirate]. We consider sea bandits those who illegally fish in our seas and dump waste in our seas and carry 
weapons in our seas. We are simply patrolling our seas. Think of us like a coast guard. 
Q. Why did you want to become a pirate? 
A. We are patrolling our seas. This is a normal thing for people to do in their regions. 
Q. Isn’t what you are doing a crime? Holding people at gunpoint? 
A. If you hold hostage innocent people, that’s a crime. If you hold hostage people who are doing illegal 
activities, like waste dumping or fishing, that is not a crime.” (Gettleman 2008) 
                                                            
13 UN Doc. S/PV.6865, 15.  
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This empirical snippet provides elements of what I have described as a “coastguard narrative” (Bueger 
2013). Within this narrative, hijacking ships and holding hostages are presented as lawful and political 
activities. Piracy as a meaningful frame of reference is rejected – and the other agencements described 
above are resisted. The activities of Muse or Sugule Ali are situated in a very different set of relations 
and linked to Somalia and its sovereignty. Other forms of agency are claimed. In the above statement, 
it is the agency of a coastguard. Indeed, several of the Somali hijacking gangs describe themselves as 
coastguards (Anonymous 2013b: 1817). The claim to agency, therefore, is related to Somalia and its 
culture and practices. It is not one of the (global) pirate agencements, but specific Somali agencements 
that provide the agency. The coastguard narrative suggests that the actions of the seagoing hijackers 
have state-like character and that the sea-going crews act on behalf of the Somali people. This 
configuration relies on a certain cultural (Somali) context and action on behalf of the state. The 
agencement plays with the modern discourse of sovereignty as the claim is that seajacking is a sovereign 
state-like practice of protection and taxation whose need arises in the context of a dysfunctional state. 
The following statement from another media interview provides an example of this line of argument:  
“We don't see the hijacking as a criminal act but as a road tax because we have no central government to 
control our sea. […] We will not stop until we have a central government that can control our sea” (Rice and 
Hassan 2008).  
If the seajackers themselves are core elements in this agencement, they are not the only ones. Indeed, 
similar statements are made by Somali coastal populations or the diaspora. Sadia Aden, president of the 
Somalia Diaspora Network, for instance, suggests that “opinions are mixed on the pirates. Some of the 
people are saying the pirates are defending our territory” (Shabazz 2008).  
The agencement rejects any claims that the seajackers are pirates. Instead, it establishes a form of 
agency which claims lawful political motives. The basis is relations between the Somalian situation and 
the discourse of sovereignty. Rather than acts of piracy, the activities are state-like practices of 
protecting, patrolling or taxation.  
 
Conclusion 
We have considered six agencements which each provide a distinct type of agency for pirates. The 
moral bandit-type pirate is produced in a web of normative-affective relations; within a security web of 
relations, the pirate is the arch-enemy, standing outside of humanity and its rules; within legal relations 
the pirate is a criminal that requires to be treated as innocent suspect until he has been prosecuted in 
court; economic relations produce pirates that are calculating individuals, and part of an economic 
business logic; while state failure and root cause agencement strips pirates of any agency and turns them 
into symptoms of a natural causal system. The final agencement is a local counter-agencement, insofar 
as actors resist being turned into such within the other agencements.   
These ‘pirates’ are forms of agency which, as I have shown, are effects of the relations and practices of 
distinct agencements. The agencements turn pirates into political, normative, security, legal, or 
economic subjects, or into structural symptoms. They accelerate and intensify agency in particular 
directions.   
Throughout my reconstruction, we have met various ‘actors’ who form part of the agencements, 
including journalists, moviemakers, actors and directors, game developers and graphic artists, 
diplomats, military officers and international bureaucrats. We have also met various scientists across 
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the disciplinary spectrum that produce statements within the agencements. These actors, not 
conventionally under the spotlight of IR analysis, are all in the business of producing pirate agency. To 
do so they engage in a diverse set of rhetorical and material activities; practices range from describing 
and interpreting to calculating or modelling. The agencements also reveal a rich set of objects and 
artefacts: movies, graphs, formulas, games, Xboxes, policy documents, or legal texts as well as the 
technologies that are used to produce them. Agency is inscribed in these objects, things, and technology. 
These various objects, practices, and actors make up the heterogeneous elements of the agencements 
that produce pirate agency. The notion of agencement brings these actors, practices and objects, often 
hidden in other forms of analysis, to the fore.  
IR has increasingly considered relationalist and practice-driven arguments. These arguments have not 
been seriously developed in a way that re-thinks agency, however. Poststructuralist analyses, such as 
those documenting how the discourse of sovereignty provides subject positions and identity, arguments 
that international relations are primarily about relations and networks, or the range of practice-
theoretical investigations showing how world politics is made in a diverse set of practices, advanced 
similar theoretical arguments.14 If these arguments are increasingly familiar to the discipline, 
surprisingly they have hardly triggered any empirical research on how the actors of international 
relations are produced, and how they navigate through a multiplicity of forms of agency. The core 
concern of my study was to show how relationalist perspectives can be used to empirically reconstruct 
a spectrum of different configurations that produce agency, in this case pirate agency. Paying empirical 
attention to the diversity of actors, artefacts, statements and other practices allows us to gain a better 
understanding of what the relations of international relations are actually made of. With the focus on 
agencements and agency, we break down taken for categories, and reconstruct how the actors of 
international relations are actually made and produced, instead of assuming their characteristics a priori.  
“Exploring, describing and analysing agencements, as well as their diffusion/transportation, constitutes 
an immense research project whose achievement still lies ahead”, claim Caliskan and Callon (2010: 
10). My reconstruction is a modest contribution to that project. Reconstructing agencements empirically 
is challenging and demanding. Tracing them is potentially endless, and easily risks producing laundry 
lists. The productivity of the form of analysis conducted is perhaps best measured by the way that it 
spurs further interesting questions; empirical ones on the case, but also more general abstract questions. 
Let me conclude by outlining a number of such further questions, concerning piracy, but also other 
kinds of agency.  
The results of the analysis firstly lead to a number of further empirical questions in the case of Somali 
piracy. Investigating pirate agencements not only provides interesting insights into piracy agency, but 
also, potentially, the agency of other international players that are related to the pirates. The 
agencements I described above are also productive of other forms of agency. For instance, in counter-
piracy the legal agencement transforms the agency of naval forces from an actor of warfare and 
deterrence to an international constabulary force. Instead of preparing to fight or attempting to threaten 
each other, navies now cooperate to patrol the oceans. The outline of six agencements therefore allows 
us to study the (transformation of) agency of the counter-piracy actors more broadly.  
Another open question is how the six agencements relate to each other and how actors – pirates and 
others – move between them. Uncovering multiplicity does not only, or primarily, have the objective 
of debunking unitary or binary understandings of a phenomenon. Understanding multiplicity, as 
Annemarie Mol (2002) and John Law (2004) have argued, implies also studying the means of how 
                                                            
14 See among others, Walker (1991), Jackson and Nexon (1999), Adler and Pouliot (2011).  
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different agencements are coordinated, are patched together, and allow actors to proceed in the face of 
difference as they move between them. How the outlined agencements are coordinated or constituted 
would be a major next step for analysis. Are there certain agencements that dominate and coordinate 
the others? Addressing this question for the case of piracy will be revealing to learn what kind of 
problematizations dominate ocean governance and security at sea. Is it a security logic, an economic, 
legal or normative order that prevails? 
Thirdly, following this question provides a starting point for zooming out historically. The pirate is a 
particular historical figure and has interesting relations to the negotiation of international order. As a 
variety of historians and theorists have shown, pirates are core figures in the negotiation of modernity: 
pirate discourses occur throughout history, and debates over who is a pirate have been core 
controversies in the negotiation of international authority, legitimacy, rights and the private/public 
distinction.15 The agencement perspective allows for a nuanced contribution to that debate. From the 
viewpoint of such a differentiated and diversified picture, a number of interesting questions can be 
asked. If we treat contemporary pirates as an indicator of modernity and contrast them to historical 
forms of piracy, is there a form of evolution? Are there any ‘new’ agencements one can observe 
compared to the earlier discourses of negotiating the agency of piracy? Although a more detailed 
analysis would be required, the answer to these questions is, perhaps, yes. In comparison to ancient 
piracy, today’s international law provides a set of fixed categories. This not only renders the legal 
agencements of piracy as quite influential, but also points us to the ongoing legalization of the oceans. 
Both the economic agencement and the causal agencement point to processes of rationalization and 
innovation in practices reflected in the techniques that these agencements draw on, such as the complex 
calculations of economics, or modelling through computer sciences. The evonolution of those 
agencements hence is indicative of a rationalization and scientification process that subjects the 
governance of the sea. A study of piracy agencements therefore leads us to major puzzles in the form 
of contemporary agency and its relation to international order.  
These indicative further questions demonstrate that the agencement perspective is open because it is not 
committed to, or restricted by, an ontological framework. We can zoom in and out as it suits us. If we 
initiate our investigations from a notion such as agencements, research does not require heavy 
ontological baggage to start with. Understanding international relations through the agencement 
perspective raises major ontological and methodology points:  
We do not need to know a priori what agency is or looks like. Instead, we derive notions of agency 
through the interpretation of experience. Agency and how it is produced becomes an empirical rather 
than philosophical puzzle. This refers to all of the major categories of international relations, whether 
it is ‘the state’, ‘international organizations’ or ‘non-governmental organisations’ and ‘social 
movements’. These are equally produced in a multiplicity of agencements. The basic outline of types 
of agencements (moral, security, legal, economic, causal, and counter) developed in my study of piracy, 
are potential starting points for an empirical analysis. Studying this multiplicity will allow to better 
understand the inherent contradictions and conflicts within and between actors.  
Another implication is methodological: we do not need to differentiate a priori between different forms 
of experience, different forms of producing statements or kinds of epistemic practices. For instance, it 
is neither a necessary nor a futile move for an analysis to differentiate between or prioritize media, 
popular culture, diplomacy or science – each, of course, being epistemic configurations and 
agencements in their own right. In agencements, these play into and inform each other to a degree that 
                                                            
15 See in particular Thomson (1994) and Heller-Roazen (2009).   
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disentangling them is not necessarily productive. Relying on ontological parsimony and prioritizing 
empirical inquiry therefore allows us to more fully apprehend the complexity of international relations.   
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